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A. Mauritius  
The Republic of Mauritius is an island state in the Indian Ocean with 1.3 million inhabitants. On the 
outbreak of the pandemic, the World Health Organisation (WHO) predicted through economic 
modelling that per capita Mauritius would be among the highest affected by Covid-19 i, among other 
factors, due to its high population density – it is the 10th most densely populated country in the 
world – and its high connectedness to other countries – one million tourists visit Mauritius 
annually.ii  
Yet, quite the opposite turned out to be the case. Mauritius responded extremely quickly and well to 
the Covid-19 pandemic. In total Mauritius only had 322 Covid-19 cases and ten death and by the 
11th of May 2020 it became Covid-19 free. iii Mauritius resilience might not come to a surprise to 
some, such as the Nobel prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, who pointed out that there is a lot the West 
could learn from Mauritius budgeting and its strong welfare state.iv Mauritius has a strong public 
health care system. The government provides free-of-charge primary, secondary and specialized 
medical care to all citizens, and primary healthcare to foreigners. Drugs are dispensed at pharmacies 
free of charge. v It’s healthcare system as a ratio of 3.4 hospital beds per 1,000 people, which is 
more than some Western nations have, including the UK, the US and Canada.vi Mauritius allocates 
almost 10 per cent of its GDP to social protection measures. Approximately 73 per cent of all health 
services are provided by the public sector and for free. viii The remaining 27 per cent are offered by 
the private sector and payable  
Measures to fight the pandemic were taken long before the country recorded its first Covid-19 case. 
Already on the 22 January, the Government of Mauritius started screening people on arrival at its 
airport. Also, in January it started to restrict flights from China and soon also from Europe.x From 28 
the Mauritian authorities quarantined visitors from countries with a high number of cases.xi The first 
three cases of COVID-19 in Mauritius were detected on 18 March 2020 (all coming from abroad).xii 
Mauritius then introduced lockdown measures, closing schools and only essential services were 
operating, it closed its borders except for repatriation flights for nationals who were stranded 
abroad and only people with a work access permit signed by the authorities were allowed to travel. 
xiii Around a week later, when 42 cases were recorded on the 24th of March, it even implemented a 
‘sanitary curfew’, closing supermarkets, bakeries and shops with immediate effect. xiv The country 
also tested, and contact traced its population. On 12 May, the government there said it had carried 
out more than 73,500 tests, which is the equivalent of 61 tests for every 1,000 people - a higher 
figure than in Germany at that point. xv  
The fact that most public services are in public ownership and control enabled Mauritius to 
effectively respond to the Covid-19 crisis. During the Covid-19 crisis the government increased its 
already well-developed health care system even further. Five dedicated Covid-19 testing centres 
were set up outside major hospitals; 18 doctors were appointed to answer calls at a special 
coronavirus hotline; hundreds of hospital beds were identified and isolated for Covid-19 patients. xvi 
Furthermore, the publicly owned airline, Air Mauritius, was repurposed to import ventilators and 
personal equipment from all over the world. xvii Over 5  
million US$ (Rs208 million) were made available to the Ministry of Health and Wellness for the 
acquisition of new medical accessories and equipment. xviii Its majority publicly owned broadband. 
xix doubled data availability and extended digital TV access for individuals at no cost in order to 
incentivise citizens to stay at home and for business to continue xx It also broadcasted online classes 
for school children on national television. xxi  
Mauritius implemented several economic protection measures, which included generous wage 
assistance schemes, the distribution of food, and support for the self-employed and those working in 
the informal sector. xxii It also amended legislation to ensure that people cannot be disconnected 
from their water or electricity services if they fall short to pay their bills. xxiii Both water and 
electricity services are publicly owned and managed. xxiv  
Moreover, members of parliament contributed 10 per cent of their salary to a special Covid-19 
solidarity fund. xxv To deal with the economic effects of the Corona crisis the parliament introduced 
a new taxation system. On 15 May 2020, the COVID-19 (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 (the 
“COVID-19 Act”) was adopted by Mauritian Parliament. xxv 
 
B. Nigeria 
Lesson 1: Early lockdown in Lagos prevented a fast spread of Covid-19 but at the same time the 
lockdown fuelled domestic violence.  
Lesson 2: An extremely underfunded heath care system and further budget cuts in the health care 
sector in the middle of the pandemic prevents Nigeria to deal effectively with the pandemic, putting 
its citizens and health care workers at risk. 
Lesson 3: Clear and cohesive communication from the government is key so that citizens know and 
follow Covid-19 guidelines. In Nigeria, the lack of clear communication created fertile ground for 
conspiracy theories and misinformation.  
By mid-August sub-Saharan Africa has not faced the high numbers of Covid-19 cases and deaths as it 
was predicted by the media. Nigeria, the continent’s most populous nation, recorded its first case on 
the 29th of February and by mid-August it only recorded 47,290 cases and 956 death.i These are 
relatively low numbers in a country with over 200 million and with a dense urban populations and 
socioeconomic challenges.ii 
There are several explanations of why Nigeria has not been as hard hit as other regions in the world, 
one is that its population is very young.iii But moreover, like many other African countries, Nigeria 
reacted quickly to the pandemic. A strict lockdown was imposed in Lagos in mid-March.iv International 
airports, schools, universities, stores and markets were closed and public gatherings suspended.v 
However, while the lockdown in Lagos contained the spread of Covid-19 it had a very harsh side-affect: 
a sharp increase of Gender Based Violence. In Lagos a three-fold increase in the number of telephone 
calls received in domestic violence hotlines were reported in one month after the lockdown. Nigeria 
is not alone in this situation, but it reflects a global trend of increased gender-based violence in 
lockdowns. vi 
Figure X: Number of reported cases of Gender Based Violence in Nigeria in March and April 2020 
 
Source: Nigeria Federal and State Ministries of Women Affairs.  
While Nigeria pioneered with innovative testing mechanisms such as drive through testing, vii the 
countries testing capacity was limited and further complicated as most of the people testing positive 
were asymptomatic.viii The lack of testing and accurate data on Covid-19 across the country limits 
Nigeria’s ability to tackle the coronavirus.  
Furthermore, Nigeria’s response to Covid-19 was severely impacted by its limited resources. In 2020 
the government allocated only 4.5 per cent of its budget on health care, which is significantly less hat 
the 15 per cent target set by the AU in 2001.ix Instead of increasing the health budget in times of the 
pandemic the Nigerian government announced to further cut its funding for local, primary healthcare 
services by more than 40 per cent this year.x The lack of investment in the sector not only results in a 
shortage of hospital beds, medical equipment and health care personal but it also created unsafe 
working conditions for health care workers.xi 
Nigeria’s federal system provided a challenge for dealing with the pandemic. While the country’s 
Covid-19 strategy was developed nationally it is relied on enforcement in individual states, which was 
often lacking. Competition between states and led individual governors to downplay the cases of 
Covid-19 in their states. As such, health advisors argued for more unity and cohesion in tackling Covid-
19. xii 
In the void of clear and cohesive communication from the governments public mistrust, 
misinformation and disinformation emerged. This mistrust was fuelled by media reports that phrased 
Covid-19 as a “disease of the elite” and conspiracy theories emanating from religious groups and 
online media.xiii For example, pastors from the Christ Embassy Church which was established in Lagos 
in the late 1980s and currently has around 13 million followers around the world, spread the 
conspiracy that the Covid-19 is linked to the rollout of 5G networks.xiv 
Economically, Nigeria has also been hit hard by the sharp decline in oil prices as a consequence of 
Covid-19. xv The IMF projected that Nigeria's economy will fall by 3.4 per cent in 2020, due to the 
consequences of the pandemic but and the crash in oil prices.xvi 
C. South Africa 
Lesson 1: Imposing a strict lockdown is not effective in preventing the spread of Covid-19 if the 
majority of the population cannot follow it.  
Lesson 2: Self-organised community responses in townships provided a social security network based 
on solidarity and improvisation to people excluded from public services. 
Lesson 3: While the alcohol ban led to a decrease in the overall mortality rate despite Covid-19 in the 
early stages of the pandemic, the alcohol ban also led to a surge in unemployment as jobs in the 
alcohol industry were cut.  
South Africa is one of the countries with the highest number of Covid-19 cases in the world, despite 
an early and hard lockdown in the end of March when the country had recorded just 400 cases. The 
country shut its non-essential economic activities and also banned the sales of alcohol in order to 
reduce alcohol-related hospital admissions in order to have more capacity on emergency wards for 
Covid-19 cases.  
Due to the alcohol ban murder rates have fallen by over 60 per cent and other violent crimes also 
decreased significantly and so did traffic accidents. In the early stages of the pandemic the overall 
mortality rate in the country was lower than in previous years despite of Covid-19.xvii However, the 
alcohol ban also led to many people losing their jobs in a country that already has an unemployment 
rate of over 30 per cent and predictions say that South Africa’s unemployment could increase to 50 
per cent by December 2020. xviii Over one million jobs in South Africa are in the alcohol industry alone 
with people working in the restaurants, bars and township taverns also losing their jobs due to the 
ban.xix 
Despite the early and strict lockdown measures Covid-19 surged exposing, once again, the inequalities 
in the provision of basic services. xx  
Twenty-six years after apartheid, the health care system is still a two-tier system, divided between 
those who can afford private health care and an overburdened and underfunded public health system 
for those who cannot, which are mostly Black citizens.xxi 
Moreover, the advice of the South African government did not match up with the lived realities of 
people in townships. The government instructed its citizens to follow disease control guidelines 
adopted in Western countries that were simply impossible to follow for people in townships living in 
overcrowded accommodation and no running water at home.  
However, South Africa demonstrated its resilience through community organising. Not only did large 
solidarity networks emerge to respond to deal with the huger crisis;xxii in the Lenasia township near 
Johannesburg the community managed to source advanced medical equipment and set up a parallel 





(inc contributions by JE Castro) 
• Early lockdown 
• trust in government politics 
• coordination between national/provincial/municipal/state bodies 
Argentina is the only large country in Latin America which has managed to maintain a consistently 
lower level of Covid19 deaths per million population. Despite a rise in cases in June, following a 
relaxation of the lockdown outside Buenos Aires, the trend in deaths remains nearly level, and still 
much lower than other large countries. The great majority of cases have occurred in the Great 
Buenos Aires area, housing around 14 million people, including the capital city. The government has 
acted rapidly to build new hospitals and provide equipment, particularly intensive care units with 
respirators. This has been remarkable, because the government took office in December 2019 and 
not only inherited the country in a state of near default, but also the previous government led by 
President Mauricio Macri had closed the Ministry of Health and seriously reduced investment in the 
sector. In a few months the government of President Fernandez mobilized teams from the National 
Scientific and Technical Research Council who have produced rapid tests for the identification of 
COVID19 and therapies based on the application of plasma from recovered patients to boost the 
immune system of infected people.  
Part of this is clearly due to an early lockdown decision, which suspended all business activity except 
for food shops, pharmacies and supermarkets.: ‘Argentina swiftly imposed a national lockdown, and 
appears to have successfully flattened the curve of contagion. “You can recover from a drop in the 
GDP,” Fernández has said about his decision to implement an early lockdown. “But you can’t recover 
from death.”’ The response was also coordinated with state governors and city mayors, so that 
public sector resources were mutually reinforcing. This is remarkable given that the governors of 
important provinces, including the capital Buenos Aires, belong to the right-wing opposition that lost 
the national election in 2019, but have accepted the need to work in coordination with the national 
government and prioritize public health. 
Public support and acceptance of the lockdown has been high: President Fernandez’ approval rating 
rose rapidly in response to his decisions over lockdown. He has conducted the crisis with 
pragmatism, achieving much success in developing cooperation with provincial and municipal 
governments. In addition, his success has been partly attributed to the traditional working-class trust 
of the Fernandez’ Peronist party: “Fernández can rely on Argentina’s disciplined Peronist party, 
which has historically been on the side of the most disenfranchised, so informal workers, who make 
up 49% of the workforce, trust Fernández to provide solutions.” This public support has been more 
important because the country is still in economic crisis, with inflation nearing 50% and the country’s 
creditors, including the IMF, threatening to force it into default. Fernandez has now managed to 
obtain a $1.8bn loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. Although the most affected 
groups in economic terms have been the low middle class and the poor, and particularly those living 
in the slum areas, the government has reacted rapidly providing economic relief and providing 
funding schemes that pay part of the salary of formal employees to reduce the number of 
redundancies.   
 
B. Chile 
The failure to provide health or economic support for the marginal communities can be seen in the 
case of a slum settlement in the northern Chilean town of Antofagasta: 
Elizabeth Andrade, a community leader of the Los Arenales macro-campamento[9] in 
Antofagasta, says: “I am concerned about the conditions in general, and the little presence 
of the government. I just spoke with a neighbour who asked me for money because in a 
month, she runs out; now, one hears it as something normal. [I’m] seeing that and how the 
neighbours ask when they are going to vaccinate us.”[10] The problem in the campamento is 
serious, in large part due to abandonment and hesitant performance of local authorities in 
this case, where, in addition to socio-economic vulnerability, there is also the fact that many 
people are immigrants in a nation where xenophobia is on the rise. “There are things like the 
housing conditions or the families who have been harmed in their work by the crisis. The 
great majority have been fired. They used to work in restaurants and construction, activities 
that ceased because of the pandemic. There is also the issue that about 80 percent of the 
macro-slum are immigrants, so we feel that we are even more invisible than before”[11]. 
The government announced measures on water supply and emergency health kits which 
was read as a measure to keep people clean but not actually alleviate the challenging 
situation of living being a highly vulnerable population during one of the most aggressive 
planetary outbreaks since 1918[12]. It is concerning that other aspects that would give some 
certainty to the immigrant population, such as food and employment security, are not part 
of the government’s plans so far. In fact, the government is doing exactly the opposite. For 
instance, the 6th April 2020 the executive promulgated a legal body named “Law of 
protection of the employment due to COVID-19”[13] which allows employers to suspend 
hiring contracts and do not pay the salaries during the pandemic but allows the employees 
to keep their job positions. Protecting the companies and not the workers seems to be the 
motto of this measure. ( Chile: Protect the campamentos! By Francisco Vergara Perucich 
and Camillo Boano UCL Bartlett DPU May 2020) 
 
C. Colombia (Medellin) 
i. Early lockdown 
ii. strong local government services and capacity 
iii. Income support scheme ‘Medellín Me Cuida’ enables poor to respect lockdown 
iv. local information system using municipal services and utilities to track economic needs, 
provide grants, tests, oxymeters, and limit access to metro 
 
The performance of Colombia as a whole has not been very good, with a cumulative death rate of 
4.1 per 100k. This has been exacerbated by inequalities, lack of public healthcare, state violence, and 
ineffective government response: “Indigenous people of the small municipality of Leticia (Amazonas) 
have been harshly affected, with 1,962 cases and 71 deaths. Institutionally, some departments have 
no capacity in terms of infrastructure – including intensive care beds – and border regions are of 
particular concern. Duque’s government was criticized for its slowness in taking political measures 
and its difficulty in responding to the economic challenges of the pandemic, particularly affecting 
women, migrants and informal workers. In addition, militarization was prioritized in some 
departments of the country in order to control populations and ‘guarantee compliance with the 
compulsory preventive isolation decreed by the national government’. In this way, confinement has 
not meant a relief from violence, on the contrary. And this violence is classist, gendered, racialized.” 
But the second-largest city, Medellin, with a population of 3.7 million, has so far performed much 
better, with a death rate of only 0.3 per 100k in mid-June.  
The city is in the province of Antioquia, which locked down early, about 5 days before the rest of the 
country. Like other cities, Medellin recognised that it needed to provide financial support for families 
to enable people to observe the lockdown, without being economically driven to resume economic 
activity, and used its resources as a provider of public services to organise this most effectively.  
People were asked to register online for an income support programme, Medellín Me Cuida 
(Medellín Takes Care of Me), including their family size and their electricity contract with the 
municipal utility EPM – which helped identify the family and enabled the city to ensure that each 
household got one grant. The scheme has made it easier to observe the constraints, providing “two 
payments of 100,000 pesos ($28), enough for a family to survive for some weeks when many have 
suspended paying rent and utility bills. People in Medellín have respected the lockdown more than 
other Colombians.”  The information is also used as part of the tracking system through which 
people can report symptoms, and then get tested, supplied with oxymeters if necessary, and 
quarantined at home. The metro also then uses the data in the system to suspend travel cards of 
families of an infected person. In June there was a rise in cases, and in deaths, with the death rate 
rising from 0.3 to 0.7: still much lower than other cities in Colombia, and very low by global 
standards.  
In June the Colombian Government Suspended its Fiscal Rules, allowing deeper deficit Spending 
throughout 2020 and 2021. 
 
D. Costa Rica 
v. Quick response by government 
vi. Universal healthcare system 
vii. Culture of collective action 
viii. Widespread testing 
The first confirmed case of Covid19 in Latin America was diagnosed in Costa Rica in March, but the 
government reacted immediately by banning mass gatherings, closing schools and non-essential 
businesses, requiring people to work from home where possible, and closing the country’s borders. 
The lockdown was very widely observed, which the health minister has said was: “due to the very 
favourable response from a population that understands the challenge we’re facing.” This reflects a 
long democratic and socialist tradition in Costa Rica – including having no armed forces.  
Costa Rica has a unified and universal healthcare system, on which it spends a higher proportion of 
GDP than the average OECD country. This allowed the country to start testing and tracing early, 
using a network of ‘sentinel’ doctors to detect cases of Covid-19. It was also identified by an 
academic article as a key factor: “that increases the likelihood of patients needing health care to 
seek medical services without worries about future debts or lack of access to medical services” 
E. Cuba 
ix. Universal public healthcare 
x. International solidarity 
Cuba has managed to control Covid-19 effectively and keep deaths down to less than 1 per 100,000. 
The country has the advantages of being an island, but also responded early, applied strict rules 
including compulsory masks and quarantining of affected people, and used the systematic door-to-
door checking that was already part of its outstanding public health system.  
It has also provided medical support for many countries during the pandemic, continuing and 
extending “Cuba’s remarkable history of sending medical teams to the world”, and of joint ventures 
in biotechnology. It has sent over 800 doctors to help 15 countries deal with Covid: Cuba sent 
doctors to Lombardy, the worst affected region in Italy, helping create an emergency field hospital; 
sent 200 doctors to South Africa.  
 
F. Ecuador (Guayaquil) 
xi. University initiative, systematic information gathering for tracking 
xii. Local council/mayor initiative 
xiii. Extra resources for public health workers and facilities 
xiv. Financial support for families in lockdown 
 
Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador, was very badly affected by an initial outbreak of Covid 19 
during a holiday period, with a death rate in April 2020 which was 10 times the normal level, and 
unburied bodies in the streets.  
The (right-wing) government of Ecuador was widely criticised for not introducing an effective 
lockdown, nor a test, track and trace system, nor for providing extra resources for hospitals to cope 
with the outbreak: "What failed here was a terrible health system that isn't even good enough for 
normal times, let alone a pandemic. And corruption, to the highest degree.” 
The problem was exacerbated by cuts in Ecuador’s healthcare system imposed by the IMF over the 
previous 3 years: “before this pandemic, Ecuador had cut its healthcare spending and conducted a 
series of layoffs in its Ministry of Health. Between 2019 and 2020, approximately 8 per cent of the 
staff were terminated…. part of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan programme which led to 
a US$1 billion reduction in spending on public employment over three years. Before this crisis, an 
aggressive crackdown on protests against the measures already claimed many lives.”  
But by July the epidemic in Guayaquil was more controlled, because of three factors.  
Firstly, a 32 year old urban planner at the University of Guayaquil, Hector Hugo, created a multi-
disciplinary team including doctors, epidemiologists and international experts to systematically map 
Covid-19 cases. The data was collated and delivered to a task-force of doctors working on a 
voluntary basis, to identify priority areas by: ‘micro-zoning, working in neighbourhoods with a higher 
concentration of cases’. This was presented as an integrated public health strategy to all levels of 
government and finally accepted by the municipality of Guayaquil. The initiative grew out of the 
‘Delta project’, a comprehensive attempt to integrate the university into the city based on 
inclusiveness, sustainability, and community participation.  
 
Secondly, ‘brigades’ of health workers were sent into the affected areas - including the poorest slum 
neighbourhoods - to find and diagnose patients, and then either send them to hospital or get them 
to self-isolate at home. The brigades also distributed locally produced masks, food, and advice on 
the importance of washing hands and social distance.  
Thirdly, the mayor, Cynthia Viteri, allocated serious resources: $35 million for healthcare - an extra 
500 doctors, temporary hospitals, the construction of 40,000 mobile health centres, and purchasing 
test kits – and $50million to support employees in small and medium businesses, providing the 
economic support which enabled people to observe quarantine and the curfew.  
 
G. Paraguay 
Paraguay imposed an effective lockdown, and has achieved relatively low death rates. However, 
these were achieved using brutal enforcement by military and police, ‘quarantining’ the poor in 
‘detention centres’, and cutting public service workers wages to save $52million. 
There has been vocal criticism of the government for the brutality of the militarised enforcement of 
lockdown, and for corrupt capture of public funds intended to deal with the pandemic: a doctors’ 
leader said “corruption has surged even more strongly, if there is an explosion of the disease, we’re 
going to be helpless”. 
The effectiveness of the lockdown threatened starvation for many because the government failed to 
provide economic support to workers who had lost their livelihoods, exposing the inequality of the 
country. Alicia Amarilla, national coordinator of the Organisation of Rural and Indigenous Women, 
said: “We’re going to see many more difficult situations come from this crisis – we’re in a country 
with far too much inequality. We know that the government won’t take privileges away from those 
that have them.” 
  
H. Surinam 
WHO Aug 2020: Suriname is preparing to come out stronger from COVID-19:  
“As the pandemic highlights the gaps in the country’s health system, the Government is acting 
quickly to drive its response, engaging partners, reaching remote communities through primary 
health care and building a strong foundation for universal health coverage. About 90% of Suriname’s 
landmass is characterized as tropical rainforest. In the most remote villages reside indigenous 
communities who need access to effective primary health care. This is just one of the many 
challenges that Suriname’s health system faces. COVID-19 has further highlighted its small health 
workforce: just eight physicians and 23 nurses per 10,000 people, health infrastructure that is still 
being developed and limited emergency response capacity, among others. … In January 2020, when 
the world became aware of the threat of COVID-19, Suriname’s Ministry of Health convened a Public 
Health Response team headed by the Director of Health. It started developing standard operating 
procedures aligned with the country’s pandemic influenza preparedness plan. Together, PAHO/WHO 
and the Ministry of Health developed guidelines for quarantine management, monitoring of ports of 
entry, protocols for early detection and screening and clinical management.” 
I. Uruguay 
xv. Democratic tradition/ trust in institutions 
xvi. Good public healthcare system 
xvii. Use of online tech to take on non-Covid health work 
xviii. Use of airport as drive-in cinema 
Uruguay has a good public sector health system.  
The recently elected centre-right government of Uruguay acted immediately, not by a compulsory 
total lockdown, but by asking citizens to practice voluntary social isolation: “responsible freedom.” 
There was a very high level of compliance, attributed to public trust in the democratic system, as 
stated by the foreign minister: “For me, that’s the big lesson of all this. The trustworthiness of 
institutions”. The country also introduced testing and tracing very early, and developed its own 
Covid19 diagnostic texts.  
The government made it easier for people to comply by providing safe alternatives to normal 
outings. After the cancellation of most flights the main airport was adapted as a drive-in cinema and 
concert venue – with airport toilet facilities available, too.  
The country re-opened its schools on June 1. It has taken on a much higher level of public debt. 
 
3. Asia-pacific 
Region: Central and South Asia 
A. India 
Lesson 1: Preparedness and Optimal Window of Time 
Lesson 2: Strict deployment of unique public health strategy of quarantine, contact tracing and 
testing thanks to grassroots leverage 
Lesson 3: Innovative and transparent public health communication to quell anxiety, build trust as 
well as enhance citizen’s knowledge and cooperation in fighting the virus 
Lesson 4: Social mobilisation to support vulnerable communities  
 
National response 
India reported its first case on January 30 (MoHFW, 2020), but authorities persisted that cases were 
one-offs with no local transmission. COVID-19 was initially underestimated due to other priorities on 
the government’s agenda (Debraj Ray, S. Subramanian, 2020). Afterwards, India has seen 
exponential growth in the number of cases, which led to a highly criticized ‘draconian’ nationwide 
lockdown on a nation of 1.3 billion people with police brutality, a lack of transparency, and a lack of 
compassion (Vidya Krishnan, 2020). India’s lockdown measures are rated at the high end of the 
University of Oxford's COVID-19 Government Response Stringency Index (University of Oxford, 
2020). Central government’s COVID-19 response is counterproductively punishing the most 
vulnerable in society without instituting a robust official support system to address the root cause 
problems with public health and safety. About 400 million people working in the informal economy 
in India were pushed to the brink of falling deeper into poverty due to catastrophic consequences 
caused by the coronavirus crisis (India Economics Times, 2020). 
Kerala 
Although Kerala, the state with over a population of 35 million, detected the first three cases on 
January 30 among a group of students returning from Wuhan (China), Kerala has reported 13,275 
cases of COVID-19 as on 21 July 2020 and 40 deaths with an impressive case fatality rate of 0.3% 
(versus 2.5% average in total India and 4.3% on global) (WHO, 2020). Kerala’s success in fighting 
COVID-19 can be attributed to not only the state’s legacy of education, previous experience in 
dealing with past outbreaks and the state’s development of the public healthcare infrastructure but 
also its early, well-synchronized and inclusive state action plan which leverages on a variety of 
community assets.  
Lesson 1: Preparedness and Optimal Window of Time 
Long before the first diagnosed case and just three days after being informed about the novel 
coronavirus in China, Kerala’s Health Minister Shailaja began to take action by setting up a control 
room, facilitating inter-sectoral coordination, instructing 14 other health districts in Kerala to follow 
suit. In January, Shailaja ordered Kerala’s four international airports to start screening incoming 
passengers and put those with symptoms to a government facility, where they were tested and 
isolated. Their samples were flown to the National Institute of Virology 700 miles away. By February, 
she was able to convene a 24-member state response team coordinating with the police and public 
officials across Kerala (Faleiro, 2020). A high-level committee led by the Chief Minister, Health 
Minister, Chief Secretary and the Principal Secretary of Health has been convened to monitor, 
coordinate and guide collaborative and participative actions in the field. The State Control room led 
by the Principal Secretary, Mission Director, National Health Mission, Directorate of Health Services, 
and Directorate of Medical Education; and its various sub-committees are tasked with closely 
monitoring of COVID-19 response. The State and the District Control Rooms played a key role in 
formulating advisories and guidelines; and guiding the early interventions focused on saving lives. 
The State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC) and the office of Kerala State Disaster Management 
Authority provided support to the Health Department for response and mitigation efforts. Early 
release of technical guidelines on contact tracing, quarantine, isolation, hospitalization, infection 
prevention and control, and purposeful capacity-building for all cadres of health and other 
interlinked departments helped bring the situation under control.  
Lesson 2: Strict deployment of unique public health strategy of quarantine, contact tracing and 
testing thanks to grassroots leverage 
Kerala government adopted strict public health protocols. Although the general incubation period of 
the virus is 14 days, Kerala enforced 28 days of home quarantine. Essential goods were delivered at 
door to people under home quarantines at the local government’s cost (Sulaiman et al. 2020). Apart 
from 650 COVID-19 centres in hostels, educational institutions and unoccupied buildings, a big 
number of isolation wards were set-up in all medical colleges, districts and general hospitals 
(Sulaiman et al. 2020).  
In addition, from early March, the state screened all international passengers. Village committees 
informed the health department about new arrivals and ensured those remained in quarantine in 
case a person managed to skip airport screening. In hotspots of Kasaragod and Kannur districts, 
some village panchayats even launched call centres, connecting those quarantined with the 
authorities (Maneesh & Aicha 2020).  
Kerala utilized a selective testing strategy rather than mass testing for the whole population. Four 
main groups prioritized for testing consisted of (1) healthcare workers who contacted with Covid-19 
patients (25,000 testing kits), (2) government staff with public contact (20,000 kits) and essential 
service providers (5,000 kits), (3) self-isolated people at home (25,000 kits), and (4) all senior citizens 
(20,000 kits) (Sulaiman et al. 2020). This approach is critical to protect the most vulnerable subsets, 
impede the spread of coronavirus with limited testing reagents supply in such a short time period. 
Lesson 3: Innovative and transparent public health communication to quell anxiety, build trust as 
well as enhance citizen’s knowledge and cooperation in fighting the virus 
During this crisis time when information is evolving and inconsistent, public communication plays an 
important role in creating clarity and catalysing positive behavioural compliance (Mendy et al., 
2020). 
Kerala deployed counsellors, celebrities and Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) to help deliver messengers 
to its citizens in the most resonating way. Actor Mohanlal and Mammooty have appeared on a video 
stressing the need for social isolation and care (Babu, 2020). The government had former Indian 
football team captain IM Vijayan talk to migrant workers. Kerala government launched a successful 
awareness campaign ‘Break the Chain’ on March 15 before the state lockdown on March 23 to 
promote the importance of hand hygiene, physical distancing and cough etiquette. Hand washing 
stations were installed in strategic locations, including exit and entry points of railway stations etc. 
to cultivate behavioural changes. “Break the Chain” campaign got a further boost as the state’s focus 
on literacy and women’s education helped it achieve near 100% vaccination levels and cultivate a 
culture of personal hygiene. A survey, conducted in 12 countries by the World Health Organization in 
2005, highlighted that hand-washing with soap after defecation had a prevalence of 34% in Kerala, 
the highest among the states/countries surveyed. Hence, when the state initiated its ‘Break the 
Chain’ campaign during the COVID-19 outbreak, the campaign served to reiterate practices of hand-
washing and use of sanitisers. Local authorities mandate that citizens hold an umbrella when in 
public places to promote involuntary social distancing by distributing umbrellas produced by 
Kudumbashree - Kerala ’s poverty eradication and women empowerment programme. 
Kerala government also committed to transparency in crisis communication to reduce the spread of 
the rumours by having Chief Minister Pinarayi Vijayan hold a telecast live press conference every 
evening to answer all the queries related to the outbreak and optimizing a variety of communication 
channels to disseminate official public health information. The Kerala Arogyam portal was launched 
by the Department of Health and Family Welfare with comprehensive information on COVID-19. 
Covid Jagratha portal and Directorate of Health Services website was introduced by the Department 
of Health and Family Welfare with comprehensive information on COVID-19. Kudumbashree formed 
close to 1.9 lakh WhatsApp groups with 22 lakh neighbourhood groups (NHGs) to educate on key 
safety measures as advocated by the government during lockdown.  
Lesson 4: Social mobilisation to support vulnerable communities  
While the central government's enforcement of a strict and sudden lockdown for weeks failed to 
provide adequate medical and economic support for its citizens, especially the underprivileged 
groups, Kerala went the extra mile in creating a safety net for some of the ones in most needs. Right 
after the announcement of the national lockdown, Kerala offered shelter in nearly 20000 camps and 
meals for thousands including about 150,000 migrant workers during the quarantine period. The 
Kudumbashree Mission’s volunteers helped launch community kitchens (Shaju Philip, 2020). 
Community Kitchen initiative through the Local Self Government Department (LSGD) with the 
support of Kudumbasree has provided more than 8 651 627 free meals to the labourers, those who 
are in quarantine, isolation, destitute and other needy persons. Distribution of millions of cooked 
meals and provision of free ration under the Public Distribution Scheme to those in need shows the 
proof of a well-thought response and compassionate relief strategy. 
Kerala was able to encourage strong public collaboration from different local organizations and civil 
societies in the production of medical equipment to guarantee the supply of drugs, masks, gloves, 
sanitizer for front line healthcare workers and serve community needs. The Kudumbashree Mission 
has coordinated many volunteers joining hands to make masks. Kerala prisoners also contributed to 
the hit in the production of 3.25 lakh two-layered cotton facemasks and 5,000 litres of sanitisers 
while there was a significant shortage of manpower (Krishnachand, 2020). 
Kerala government also stressed the importance of psychosocial services to acknowledge stress-
related illness and create healing environments, especially to those most vulnerable. Telemedicine 
portal e-sanjeevani provided psychosocial support via tele consultation across the State and 
Ottakalla oppamunduto to the vulnerable population. 1143 mental health professionals, including 
psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, clinical psychologists and counsellors have been deployed to 
provide support to people in quarantine. Counselling service is also provided to frontline workers 
working in corona outbreak control activities. Till date, the psychosocial services have reached out to 
11 68 950 people in the state.  
Kerala made strides in its efforts to ensure subsistence through income transfers for vulnerable 
populations. 55 lakh elderly and disadvantaged have received Rs 8,500 as welfare payments. The 
welfare funds disbursed Rs 1,000-3,000 per person for an equal number of workers. A food kit was 
sent out to each family to support food needs during social isolation time. Interest-free consumption 
loan of Rs 2,000 crore has been distributed by April, 2020 (Isacc, 2020). 
B. Pakistan 
Lesson 1: Government’s vague public messaging - A country of disbelief and distrust in government 
Lesson 2: Gaps in the pandemic management at provincial and national levels 
Lesson 3: Authority battle between state and hard-line clerics 
Pakistan recorded 274,799 confirmed cases with 6,035 deaths, which ranked the country the 14th 
globally in terms of total number of cases as at 7 August 2020. The social, political and cultural 
context of the country hindered its ability to fight against coronavirus with resistance created by 
community dynamics, local/religious beliefs, political instability, economic fragilities, and a lack of 
trust in government and institutions (Shaikh, 2020).  
Challenges of Pakistan 
Geographic location: A densely populated Pakistan with around 220 million inhabitants acts as a 
catalyst for the spread of virus. Additionally, the border countries of Pakistan including China, India, 
Iran, Afghanistan either experienced Covid-19 for the first time or encountered the highest numbers 
of Covid-10 mortalities in Asia. 
Low literacy rate: The literacy rate of Pakistan was 59 per cent in 2017, among the lowest literacy 
rates in the world (Plecher, 2020). It would be challenging to convey the information and 
communication and mobilize its citizens for globally aligned actions. 
Religion: Under the influence of religious propagandists, Covid-19 is a conspiracy hatched by non-
Muslims to keep believers from worshiping at mosques and following their religion. Performing 
pilgrimage, religious congregations in Pakistan rooted for the transmission of novel pathogens as 
social distancing could not be maintained.  
Struggling economy: Before the COVID-19 outbreak, Pakistan’s economy was struggling to stay afloat 
with twin deficit problems (fiscal and current account), drastic decline in exports and foreign 
remittance, growing public debt (Sareen, 2020). Being afraid of economic collapse could hamper a 
complete knockdown policy to save its economy. 
The case of Pakistan provides a unique story about how an Islamic country combated the 
coronavirus outbreak with three major issues as listed below. 
Lesson 1: Government’s vague public messaging - A country of disbelief and distrust in government 
There was no unified statement and an orderly policy to inform, educate, and protect the masses 
against the threat of Covid-19, which was considered a rapidly spreading conspiracy theory with 
unclear origins. The most obvious reason for the spread of this conspiracy theory is the 
government’s unclear and ambiguous public messaging (Khattak, 2020). Even before coronavirus 
grabbed national headlines, more than half of Pakistanis (55%) believed Khan and his ministers were 
incompetent (Gallup Pakistan, 2019). When the country was hit by the pandemic, Prime Minister 
Khan’s speeches which downplayed the nature of the virus by considering it nothing more 
dangerous than the common flu coupled with his government’s flip flopping announcements – a 
lockdown, a smart lockdown and finally no lockdown, all without flattening the COVID-19 curve — 
further deepened the disbelief and distrust among the Pakistani (Khattak, 2020). Without details and 
explanation in his public message, Imran Khan, Pakistan’s prime minister spoke against the benefits 
of lockdowns and said ‘deaths would rise anyway’, urged citizens to follow the standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) guiding social distancing guidelines and ‘living with the virus’ approach. The 
media raised the concern why the country needed to follow the SOPs whilst their prime minister had 
refused the health benefits of lockdown and whether the SOPs were necessary. Yet thanks to the 
government’s contradictory public messaging, a majority of Pakistanis still haven’t registered the 
danger. Thus, the widespread violations of the SOPs have its root from weak message from the top 
(Afzal, 2020) 
Many citizens live in a state of denial and disbelief. WhileImran Khan's government said the drop in 
the daily number of new coronavirus cases in July was due to its "smart lockdown" strategy, others 
believe that the trend could be a result of misreporting and inadequate testing. A government 
official in a semi-urban district in Punjab province noted that he had direct orders from his superior 
to omit numbers by almost half, which resulted in his report that the number of newly confirmed 
cases were 34 new cases instead of 63. A deliberate misreporting at the district level raises concerns 
regarding the accuracy of the official figures nationwide (Bari, 2020). 
Lesson 2: Gaps in the pandemic management at provincial and national levels 
Decentralization of power and resources has resulted in lacking national healthcare response in 
Pakistan. The management of Coronavirus on the provincial and national levels has laid bare gaps in 
governance and structural issues. The 18th Amendment of the Pakistan Constitution in 2010 
specifies that healthcare is a ‘provincial responsibility’. This was an effort to build democracy with 
decentralized power by establishing the prime minister and ministers as the federal government and 
gave more governing powers to provinces (Bremmer, 2020). However, the Covid-19 outbreak 
reveals the problem of power delegation in Pakistan. For instance, there was a dispute between 
Isalamabad authorities (the capital of Pakistan) and the Federal Government in re-opening border 
policy with Iran. While the provincial authorities of Isalamabad concerned they did not have 
sufficient resources to enact a quarantine regime at the Pakistan-Iran border, with isolation of 
returnees in accordance with health protocols, the Federal Government favoured cross border 
trading to keep the wheels of their economies running; hence it ignored the local pleas and decided 
to reopen the border (Karim, 2020). There was a call for immediate activation of the highest level of 
national response management protocols to ensure the all-of-government and all-of-society 
approach to fight against COVID-19. To do so, the corporation and alignment between provincial and 
national levels is critically urgent (Noreen et al., 2020) 
Lesson 3: Authority battle between state and hard-line clerics 
The battle of social and political power between state authority and hard-line clerics brought out 
contradicting measures for public safety in Pakistan. Dealing with religious congregations in times of 
epidemics could be challenging. Most world religions prescribe congregations of its adherents at 
local, national, and international levels as part of their faith (Quadri, 2020). The gathering proved a 
perfect transmission point, infecting indeterminate numbers of Pakistanis, at least two Kyrgyz 
citizens and two Palestinians who flew home and introduced the virus to the Gaza Strip. A similar 
gathering of Tablighi Jamaat in Malaysia infected more than 620 participants who then returned to 
half a dozen countries across Southeast Asia (Ur-Rehman et al., 2020). Islamic countries like the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar had imposed restrictions on congregational prayers at 
mosques amid the current COVID pandemic through fatwa. While religious congregation could be 
root for the transmission of novel pathogens, there was a delay in the decision of Pakistani 
government about the imposition of a ban on mosque prayers and large religious gatherings, due to 
fear of a backlash from Islamist groups (Noreen et al. 2020). 
While clerics were fully aware of the transmission risks at their mosques where worshipers gather to 
perform ablutions together before cramming into the mosques, shoulder to shoulder in supplication, 
they persisted to protect their bottom line: money and influence for fear of losing their social and 
political control over society if mosques were closed during such a major event as Ramadan. Under 
pressure from hard-line clerics, the Pakistan government has failed to ban religious gatherings at the 
behest of the mullahs by signing an agreement that let mosques stay open for Ramadan as long as 
they followed 20 rules, including forcing congregants to maintain a six-foot distance, bring their own 
prayer mats and do their ablutions at home.  
 
4. Region: East Asia and Asia Pacific 
A. South Korea 
Lesson 1: Tests, tests, tests 
Lesson 2: Thorough contact tracing 
Lesson 3: Timely and transparent public information  
 
During the first wave of Covid-19, South Korea was fighting with quick and decisive institutional 
capacity-building efforts in diagnostic testing, tracing contacts, isolating confirmed and suspected 
cases, providing treatments, and encouraging social distancing accurately. Without closing 
businesses, issuing stay-at-home orders, or implementing many of the stricter measures adopted by 
other high-income countries, South Korea relied on digital surveillance technologies to excel the 
above efforts on a large scale and flattened the epidemic curve quickly (Ariadne Labs, 2020). It took 
around 34 days (from 3rd March to 17th April) for South Korea to reduce the number of new 
infections from 851 to 22 with the low mortality rate of 2% (Ahn, 2020). 
The success of South Korea as well as its active civic participation in the Covid-19 control could be 
related to its previous experience with MERS-CoV in 2015 (Oh et al., 2020; Kim, 2020). Learning from 
its flawed response to MERS, South Korea attacked the novel virus with improved preparedness, a 
well-functioning national health insurance system, ample human resources and infrastructure. There 
was a strongly constructive collaboration among key institutions such as the President’s office, the 
Ministry of Health, the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Ariadne Labs, 2020). 
Local governments at the city and the provincial levels had autonomy to develop and implement 
emergency response within the national government’s emergency response framework. 
Notably, there was a high level of civic awareness, voluntary cooperation in adhering to personal 
hygiene measures, complying with self-quarantine measures, maintaining social distancing in South 
Korean.  
Around 89.1 percent of the surveyed public granted support to the tracking measure using CCTV 
footage, which shows a positive public perception of the government policy (Jo, 2020; Chan, 2020). 
Local businesses also worked closely with the government. The two Korean conglomerates, Samsung 
and LG, allowed its training facilities to be used as treatment centres for COVID-19 patients with mild 
symptoms whilst NGOs willingly provided food and survival kits for those under self-quarantine 
order (Lee, Heo & Seo, 2020) 
As many countries are transitioning to the reopening phase, South Korea’s experiences may offer 
worthwhile lessons about how to keep case numbers low without limiting most activities.  
Lesson 1: Ramped up testing capacity 
South Korea harnessed public-private partnerships to ramp up rapid and widespread low-contact 
testing as well as facilitate the creation of test kits in the lab.  
The private sector was able to rapidly develop test kits due to its strong research capability. A Seoul-
based start-up managed to reduce the test results from 24 hours to only 6 hours thanks to artificial 
intelligence-powered automated production. This was a response to the Korean Center for Diseases 
Control (KCDC)’s direction towards private companies to produce a diagnostic reagent within a week 
of the first case diagnosis. The government also simplified the process of and swiftly returned 
approvals of diagnostic reagents which acts as a catalyst for fast tracking of testing kits generation 
and production (United Nations, 2020). Thousands of test kits were manufactured daily, with the 
number reaching up to 100,000 kits per day in March. By April 24, 118 institutions were licensed to 
run diagnostic test (Fisher & Sang-hun, 2020). Collectively, these institutions had the capacity to run 
an average of 15,000 tests (and up to 20,000) per day (Ariadne Labs, 2020). 
South Korea also pioneers innovative low-contact testing approaches via drive-through and walk-
through diagnostic tests to reduce health care worker exposure and enhance capacity within a short 
window of time. By April 1, about 80 drive-through centres were in operation with the ability to test 
thousands of people each day.  
Lesson 2: Comprehensive contact tracing 
Tracing capacity was enabled by past experience and technological innovation 
In the aftermath of the MERS outbreak in 2015, South Korean legislators had tailored a playbook in 
preparation for any following outbreak. It allowed authorities to extract surveillance footage, credit 
card histories and GPS data of both confirmed and potential patients. Specifically, there was an 
amendment in the article 76-2(2) of South Korea’s Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act 
(IDCPA) that allows the ministry of health to have extensive legal authority to collect private data, 
without a warrant, from both already confirmed and potential patients (Kim, 2020). Based on that 
legislation background, KCDC runs the contact tracing system that uses data from 28 organizations 
including National Police Agency, The Credit Finance Association, three smartphone companies, and 
22 credit card companies to trace the movement of individuals with COVID-19 (Ahn, 2020). The 
system can accurately track the infecteds’ movement data.  
Combined with mass testing, and public disclosing of information campaigns, tailored information 
about the infected persons’ age and gender, and a detailed log of their movements, gathered by 
KCDC, was sent via text messages to South Koreans. This information helps people target their social 
distancing more effectively rather than rationing all activities together (Argente, Hsieh & Lee, 2020).  
Lesson 3: Public response and trust building 
Timely and transparent public information system counter panic, foster public trust in government’s 
responses, and enhance compliance with public health guidance. 
Backed by legislation, transparent public communication played an important role in cultivating 
public trust and ensuring that the citizens comply with government guidance. Gleaning crisis 
communication lessons from MERS 2015, the South Korea government committed early on about 
absolute transparency with the public by sharing every detail of how this virus is evolving, how it is 
spreading and how the government responds. As soon as the first Covid-19 case was confirmed on 
January 20, South Korea had immediate response in setting up a comprehensive and speedy testing 
regime; and provided concurrent real-time information dissemination to the public (Cha & Kim, 
2020). KCDC has made it easy for citizens to access up-to-date and accurate information or any 
revisions to regulations including through twice-a-day press briefings, targeted alerts through text 
messages, 1339 Call Centre, websites, and mobile applications (KCDC, 2020). Transparent public 
communication played an important role in cultivating public trust and ensuring that the citizens 
comply with government guidance. Approximately 65% South Korean residents trust their 
government in policy response during Covid-19 pandemic thanks to progressively reduced number 
of new cases and significant efforts of the government to flatten the 
B. Australia 
Lesson 1: Timely and Effective Border Control and Lockdown 
Lesson 2: Utilize telehealth and virtual hospital combining with integrated app-based and 
traditional contact tracing 
Lesson 3: Saving the economy can come at a high cost 
 
Figure 1 Daily Covid-19 Cases in South Korea (as of 11 August 2020) (Author's Own) 
In the first wave, Australia’s response to Covid-19 has been viewed as fairly reasonable with the 
development of telehealth and virtual hospitals that extends the reach to a wide range of patients, 
especially those in rural areas, while managing to introduce a combination of stimulus packages. 
Most measures taken by the Australian government are aligned with those in other developed 
countries. The lockdown measures seem to be effective in the first wave of lockdown as Australia 
successfully brought down the record to below 50 daily cases since mid-April. During the first wave, 
up until April 15, Australia reported 6447 cases with 63 deaths. There are criticisms that Australia 
could have controlled the situation better if it had shut international borders earlier, during the early 
stage, and utilized contact tracing apps. Here, lessons from the first wave’s responses in Australia are 
discussed, knowing that Australia is not a prime example of success.  
Lesson 1: Timely and Effective Border Control and Lockdown 
In the beginning phase of the coronavirus outbreak, Australia’s response was not fast and intensive 
enough. Before the first confirmed case, biosecurity officials began screening arrivals on flights from 
Wuhan to Sydney. However, checks at border were limited to self-identification screening, which is 
not as objective such as scanning for body temperature. The first confirmed case was on 25 January 
2020, in Victoria. The government immediately blocked flights arriving from China, and later on, Iran, 
South Korean, and Italy. Australia quarantined around 600 Australians arriving from Wuhan and the 
surrounding Hubei province on Christmas Island. This act was condemned by many at the time, yet, 
having been defended by the government that believed all cases must have been directly imported 
from Hubei.  
It took nearly 2 months after the first confirmed case for the government to establish policies on 
social distancing rules, limited gatherings, and shutdown of non-essential services (on March 15), 
then closed border to all non-residents (March 20).  This slow reaction has led to the peak of the 
pandemic in Australia by the end of March with 537 daily new confirmed cases and almost 5,000 
total cases. 
Lesson 2: Utilize telehealth and virtual hospital combining with integrated app-based and 
traditional contact tracing 
Australia had its own strengths in the fight against the pandemic. The government established apps, 
tools, and channels such as COVIDSafe app, Coronavirus Australia app, Australian Government 
WhatsApp channel for COVID-19 to keep citizens informed of daily situations. COVIDSafe app, an 
enhanced manual tracing app that uses Bluetooth to collect users’ contacts within 21 days to the 
government database was state-funded developed.  
Since mid-March, Australian government has provided citizens free-of-charge telehealth 
consultation via phone or video with general practitioners (GPs), specialists, nurses, and mental 
health allied health workers. Telehealth alleviates the accessibility gap in rural areas, obviates the 
need to travel, and encourages people to seek support due to its convenience. On February 3rd, 
Australia opened the first virtual hospital lifting the increasing pressure on hospital emergency, ICU 
departments, and their front-line staff. Virtual hospitals enhance and mitigate the telehealth 
system's limitations by remotely tracking the condition of patients from their own home, thus, 
supporting older people to live independently, improving access to care for rural patients, and 
utilizing the availability of the front-line staff and medical students. However, the reach of telehealth 
initiative and digital contact tracing to older people is uncertain due to the lack of accessibility to 
smartphones and poor internet connections. 
 
Lesson 3: Saving the economy can come at a high cost. 
The Australian government aimed to reduce unemployment by a combination of different stimulus 
measures. The government’s economic main support packages are the JobKeeper and JobSeeker, 
which was announced 1 day after the order to shut down non-essential services on 29th March. 
JobKeeper is a wage subsidy program that offers to pay employees’ wages for eligible firms which 
are affected by the pandemic. JobSeeker are a fortnightly payment to unemployed workers during 
this hard time. It is claimed that these packages are supporting 3.55 million workers, which is about 
25% of the Australian workforce.  
On 26th May, PM Scott Morrision announced the JobMaker and JobTrainer plan, which are future 
plans focusing on recovery. The program will provide a $1.5 billion fund on educating and training 
skilled workforce as well as about $3 billion targeted package on infrastructure sector, screen and 
creative industry. Moreover, Australian residents can tap into their superannuation fund with a 
maximum draw of $10,000 for each of the financial year 2019-20 and 2020-21. The government also 
provides immediate cash flow for SMEs that are unable to generate enough cash to afford rent and 
bills in term of loans or one-off rent relief payment. Other supports for local business consist of tax 
incentive or deferral of tax liabilities until January 2021.  
Despite all those efforts, in June, the unemployment rate in Australian jumped to 7.1% with the 
youth unemployment rate of 16.1%. Australia’s economy shrank by 0.3% in the March quarter. 
However, it is estimated that the economic support package has saved around 700,00 jobs which 
lowers the unemployment rate by 5% already. However, the unemployment rate is still projected to 
peak at 10% at the end of the year before markets can recover. 
KPMG estimated that the spending on those packages as of 4 June totals $259 billion or 13.3 percent 
of GDP in the span of 3 months. As a result, Australia’s budget deficit was $86 billion in the financial 
year ending June 2020, compared to the forecast of $5 billion budget surplus at the beginning of the 
year, and that budget deficit is the highest since World War II. More debt is expected in the 2020-21, 
and the net debt can grow to $677 billion, more than a third of the country’s GDP. While most 
countries introduce costly stimulus packages to save the economy and save jobs, how these 
packages endure through the next wave(s) and whether they certainly made a difference to the rate 
of recovery later on is still unknown.  
 
 
C. New Zealand 
Lesson 1: Effective, Stringent and Early Lockdown 
Lesson 2: Public Mobilisation and Public Trust 
New Zealand has been considered as one of the most successful countries in tackling the Covid-19 
pandemic so far. New Zealand determined to attack it head on, aiming to fully eliminate the infectious 
virus by introducing early lockdown and social distancing measures.  
Despite initial resistance and doubts about the economic impacts from critics, the government of NZ 
has proved the chosen strategies as effective. As of 28 June, NZ recorded an accumulated 1557 cases, 
22 deaths with only 21 current active cases and 78 cases since May1. The country exemplifies the 
importance of righteous leadership, consistent policies well-informed by scientific evidence and 
transparent, thorough public communication. Hence, the government, led by PM Jacinda Ardern, has 
earned the trust of the people in the first wave of the virus and it hopes to maintain the success 
through the upcoming phases.  
 
Lesson 1: Effective, Stringent and Early Lockdown 
On February 28th, NZ recorded its first case, a citizen in her 60s who returned to Auckland from Iran2. 
At 28 cases mark, on 19 March, the government decided to close its border for international visitors 
and returned citizens will have to spend 14 days in government-controlled isolation. A week later, PM 
Jacinda Arden implemented the most stringent lockdown, which is stage 43. Only a limited number of 
 
1 “COVID-19 - Current Cases,” Ministry of Health NZ, accessed August 5, 2020, 
https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-novel-coronavirus/covid-19-current-
situation/covid-19-current-cases. 
2 “New Zealand Confirms Case of Covid-19 Coronavirus,” RNZ, February 28, 2020, 
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/410625/new-zealand-confirms-case-of-covid-19-coronavirus. 
3 On March 2020, NZ government introduced the covid-19 alert system 
essential businesses were permitted to carry on, including border agencies, media, people in building 
and construction of essential projects, courts staff, couriers and bank workers. Supermarkets, dairies, 
food banks and pharmacies were allowed to operate while even butchers, bakers, farmer markets and 
fruit shops were asked to shut down. Restaurants were also closed as dine-in and takeaway were 
banned. Schools needed to move online. Within a month of lockdown, NZ successfully flattened the 
curve. 
NZ’s particular geography4 and low population density5 may have helped some policies work more 
effectively. However, if put in comparison to Australia, the true determinants for NZ’s success must 
have lied in how the government prioritised public health and implemented rigorous measures from 
the early on.  
The government is cautious when it comes to easing lockdown. New Zealand initially planned to stay 
in alert level 4 for 4 weeks. However, coming to the end of that period, PM Arden announced to extend 
for further 5 days, even when the country had seemed to successfully contain the virus spread as its 
transmission rate6 was 0.48 while the overseas rate was 2.57. On 28 April, after 9 consecutive days of 
single digit number of daily new cases, the country officially moved to alert level 3. Under level 3, 
people were still instructed to stay home unless for food, work, exercise or medical reasons. Some 
businesses like restaurants can open for takeaway but social distancing practices must be in place. 
After 2 weeks (12 days of single digit and 2 days of no new cases on 12th and 13rd May), NZ moved 
down to level 2. And on 8 June, after almost 3 weeks of zero cases, NZ for the first time had no more 
active cases of covid-19 in the whole country. Only then, the country moved to alert level 1, lifting 
restrictions on work, school, sports, domestic travel and gathering size. However, border controls 
were still in force with mandatory 2-week quarantine for outside returnees. 
 
- Level 1: The disease is contained 
- Level 2: The disease is contained, but the risk of community transmission remains 
- Level 3: High risk the disease is not contained 
- Level 4: Likely that disease is not contained 
  Level 4 is the highest level with range of lockdown measures to try to contain the virus outbreaks 
4 NZ is located in the middle of the South-Western Pacific Ocean, with the nearest country, Australia, about 
2,000 kilometres away. 
5 NZ has small population of 4.9 million, and low density (115 people/square kilometre, compared with 8,358 
of Singapore, 527 of South Korea, 281 of United Kingdom or 36 of United States).  
6 Transmission rate or the reproduction number is used to reflect how infectious a disease is. The rate of 1 
means that 1 infected person in average will transmit the disease to 1 other person. When the rate is less than 
1 then the total number of infected individuals is declining and vice versa. 
7 “Covid-19: Government Extends Lockdown to Monday 27 April,” RNZ, April 20, 2020, 
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/414678/covid-19-government-extends-lockdown-to-monday-27-april. 
 
Figure 2 Daily New Cases and Lockdown in New Zealand (as of 11 August 2020) (author's own) 
       
Lesson 2: Public Mobilisation and Public Trust 
Since the beginning of the outbreak, the Government’s leadership has combined relevant expert 
knowledge, public education efforts, and mobilization of state resources that helped New Zealand 
rapidly achieve rapid and complete control over COVID-19 pandemic8. The government applied a 
multi-sectoral approach in its policy responses. Prime minister, Ardern, is the leader alongside with 
public service, health expert, and senior officials in the COVID-19 Task Force9.  
To build trust between the government and citizens, New Zealand government decisions were guided 
by scientific advice, facts, evidence, and a willingness to listen to experts10. New Zealand focuses on 
informing and educating the public about coronavirus by several reinforced and hard messages in 
government advertising and press conferences. In order not to make people feel overwhelmed by 
 
8 Suze Wilson, “Pandemic Leadership: Lessons from New Zealand’s Approach to COVID-19:,” Leadership, May 
26, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1177/1742715020929151. 
9 “The People Leading New Zealand’s Fight against Covid-19,” RNZ, March 31, 2020, 
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/covid-19/413048/the-people-leading-new-zealand-s-fight-against-covid-19. 
10 Australian Government Department of Health, “Our Medical Experts,” Text, Australian Government 
Department of Health (Australian Government Department of Health, March 26, 2020), 
https://www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert/government-
response-to-the-covid-19-outbreak/our-medical-experts. 
hard messages, Ardern, New Zealand Prime Minister, has launched informal, chatty, and personable 
Facebook Live to demonstrate an empathetic concern for the affected New Zealand population. Daily 
press briefing, set speeches, Facebook Live sessions, government advertising and websites help the 
leader attentively address the practicalities, i.e. disrupt normal daily routine, along with soliciting 
feedback to unite and build trust with citizen11. Additionally, enabling kindness initiative, a creative 
response of the New Zealand government to COVID-19, asked all New Zealanders to be kind and offer 
support to others when the country moved to alert level 412. As a result, most New Zealanders have 
been supportive of the government's social mobilization effort shown by the result from an 
international poll that 88% New Zealanders surveyed “trust the government to make the right decision 
around the response to COVID-19”—higher than developing countries like the US and Japan13. 
 
5. Region: South East Asia 
South East Asian nations have been dealing fairly well in comparison to Latin America and Western 
Europe in terms of the rate of infection and the number of deaths so far. It’s worth noting that there 
are 3 countries that have close trading relationship with China with no deaths in the first wave. They 
are Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia with total population of more than 121 million people14. Yet, in the 
second wave, South East Asia is now experiencing rising cases with local transmission.  
A. Philippines 
Lesson 1: Effective Lockdown requires consistency and civil participation 
Lesson 2: Low-income people support must come from the government 
Lesson 3: Preparedness of Public Health system 
 
Lesson 1: Effective Lockdown requires consistency and civil participation  
Having imposed a controversial lockdown strategy, criticised for violence and strictness, the 
Philippines has not succeeded in reducing the number of Covid-19 cases as intended.  
In mid-March, President Duterte imposed one of the world’s longest and strictest lockdowns to curb 
the coronavirus spread. Metro Manila and non-essential businesses were shut, people were told to 
stay home. Between March 17 and July 25, Philippine police made 76,000 arrests and recorded more 
than 260,000 violations of curfew or lockdown rules. In April, the President stated that quarantine 
breakers would be shot dead by the military. The government also used questionable military-style 
 
11 “(1) Watch | Facebook,” accessed August 4, 2020, 
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=221367342256725; “(1) Live | Facebook,” accessed August 4, 2020, 
https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=210287716712976&ref=watch_permalink. 
12 “Prime Minister: COVID-19 Alert Level Increased,” The Beehive, accessed August 2, 2020, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/prime-minister-covid-19-alert-level-increased. 
13 Toby Manhire, “Almost 90% of New Zealanders Back Ardern Government on Covid-19 – Poll,” The Spinoff 
(blog), April 8, 2020, https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/08-04-2020/almost-90-of-new-zealanders-back-ardern-
government-on-covid-19-poll/. 
14 Population of Vietnam is 97.4 million, of Laos is 7.3 million, of Cambodia is 16.7 million (estimated by UN in 
2020) 
strategies such as house-to-house inspections and asking neighbours to report suspected cases. 
More than 900 complaints alleging torture, inhumane treatment, arrests, or detention were made to 
the Philippines' Commission on Human Rights. However, so many exemptions have been made to 
the lockdown of the capital, Manila, that the rule practically makes no sense. Millions of business 
owners, workers, and government officials were granted a waiver. They travel in and out of the 
capital on a daily basis, which could have made them asymptomatic carriers of Covid-19.  
Yet, as restrictions were eased in June to revive the economy, the Philippines’ cases have jumped to 
more than 100,000. This is the second-highest number of Covid-19 infections and deaths in 
Southeast Asia, behind Indonesia so far.  
Lesson 2: Low-income people support must come from the government 
Strict lockdown of more than 2 months since March has disrupted economic activities significantly. 
Unemployment rate to spike to the nation’s record high of 17.7% in April, jumping from 5.3% in 
January 2020. Until June, 2.6 million people had lost their jobs during the lockdown with the forecast 
of up to 10 million who could be unemployed this year as a result of the pandemic. The economy 
contracted 0.7% in the first quarter of 2020, and further 16.5% in second quarter, the biggest blow in 
the country economy in nearly 4 decades. 
In May, the Philippines decided to gradually lift its restrictions to reignite the economy. Meanwhile, 
many low-income people had to go out to make daily livings, daily records of new covid-19 cases 
were reported. In response, the government provided cash aid to around 18 million low-income 
households, especially households with monthly income of less than ₱10 thousand (approx. 200 
USD) under the national government’s social amelioration program. The emergency support for 
vulnerable groups and individuals is expected to cost the government ₱595.6 billion (US$12 billion). 
Also, the government is expected to spend additional ₱1.1trillion (US$22.2 billion) on fiscal and 
monetary policies to boost the economy.  
However, to what extent the economy recovers is still doubtful as domestic spending plummeted 
when family income shrank, and citizens further cut their spending amid uncertainty in the future 
job market. 
Lesson 3: Preparedness of Public Health system 
As a result of inadequate health care system, the Philippines has the second-highest mortality rate 
due to COVID-19 among the ASEAN countries. Healthcare system in the Philippines experienced a 
shortage of adequate health facilities and equipment, i.e. personal protective equipment (PPE), 
mechanical ventilators, and hospitals with ICUs and isolation beds, and an insufficient number of 
health workers outside the metropolitan area.  
To cope with the issue, the Department of Health partnered with private sectors to meet the surge 
in demand COVID-19 (.). Additionally, the non-existence of Centres for Disease Control and 




Lesson 2: Income Inequality matters.  
In the fight against Covid-19, Singapore has knowingly utilised a range of technological 
developments successfully to contain the first wave.  
As a highly connected country, Singapore continuously undertook precautionary measures even 
before any case was identified. Ministry of Health, Singapore (MOH) widely updated on the situation 
in Wuhan, issued warnings to travel advisory boards and preschools since January 2nd. Immediately 
after the first imported case was identified on 23rd January, screening and travel restrictions were 
imposed at borders. A multi-ministry taskforce was set up 4 days after. Singapore’s response was not 
only fast but also thorough. The government announced sector-specific advisories to all businesses 
and institutions in the country, from clinics, hospitals, transportation companies, shipping 
businesses, hospitality and premise owners to offices and schools.  
Imported cases were the initial source of infection, which was rationed by travel restrictions. Yet 
local transmission was unavoidable. Singapore prepared its citizens well-ahead of all other countries 
with distribution of masks (on Feb 01), importation of hand sanitisers, thermometers and protective 
gears (on Feb 17), and domestic production of vitro test kits by Singapore’s own Biotech (on Mar 
04)15. With nearly 80% of smartphone penetration, Singaporeans are susceptible to the idea of 
contact tracing via government-developed16 TraceTogether app using Bluetooth technology17. 
Around 37%18 of the population have voluntarily downloaded the app since its launch on March 20th. 
However, the recent spike in the number of cases, mainly clustered in migrant workers’ dormitories, 
revealed Singapore’s economic inequality, which then may be the driving force for further local 
transmission. The government then quickly developed and handed out for free TraceTogether 
tokens, an alternative to TraceTogether app but more suitable for non-smart-phone users, the 
elderly and the poor. On June 28th, 10,000 seniors received the first batch of tokens19. The 
government hopefully combines both app and token to reach universal contact tracing within the 
country soon.  
  
 
15 Ministry of Health, Singapore Covid-19 Updates: https://www.moh.gov.sg/covid-19/past-updates 
16 The app was developed by Government Technology Agency (GovTech) and Ministry of Health. 
https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/whats-new/press-releases/launch-of-new-app-for-contact-tracing 
17 Statistica reported 4.65 million smartphone users in 5.69 million Singaporeans in 2020. 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/494598/smartphone-users-in-singapore/ 
 






Lesson 1: Effective Manual Contact Tracing  
Lesson 2: Social and Business Mobilisation  
Lesson 3: Public Health System: Alert, Quarantine, Testing and Medical Insurance 
On January 16th, the Ministry of Heath (MOH) issued warnings to all government agencies and 5 
days later, to hospitals and local clinics via <CDC> system. Vietnam, and Hanoi in particular, is no 
stranger to epidemics. The SARS and MERS epidemics put the country’s health authorities in 
constant alertness and the Minister of Health set up the national system of pandemic alert. 
This system proved its value on January 23rd, when the first cases of Covid-19 in Vietnam were 
quickly identified. 2 Chinese nationals from Wuhan, travelling along the country via Hanoi’s port, 
were showing symptoms and the local clinic in <city> which was warned 2 days earlier notified the 
central government straight away. Realising that there must have been many more cases 
unidentified or asymptomatic passing through the border every day, the National Steering 
Committee on Epidemic Prevention, led by Deputy PM Vu Duc Dam, was set up immediately on 
January 30th. 2 days later, PM <name> announced National Epidemic Warning. The whole nation 
was on a heating bed. On February 3rd, when 7 cases were confirmed, all schools were closed, no 
public or religious events were allowed. All activities in the country were halted, to fight Covid-19. 
Then, there were <number> of cases in Wuhan and no European or American nations took any 
action yet. Vietnam was deemed ‘overreactive’ and ‘draconian’ in its approach by many political 
respondents.  
The country went into lockdown effectively from March 30th to May 2nd starting when the PM 
announced the Nationwide Pandemic. Vietnam introduced strict measures, focusing on ensuring 
that all people stayed at home and should have expected to work from home if possible and 
encouraged businesses to reduce commuting. Economic activities were halted. Government officials 
had to alternate working hours and days whilst all education, entertainment and food businesses 
must be closed. As the world’s top rice exporter, Vietnam decided to temporarily stop exporting rice 
as well as health-related equipment. To compensate for economic losses, the government directed 
Electricity Vietnam (its monopolistic state-owned power producer) not to increase electricity prices 
(which are due to be increases quarterly), delayed tax payments and collaborated with state-owned 
banks and SBV (State Bank of Vietnam) to introduce low-interest loans to help businesses through 
the period. Independent shops and restaurants are encouraged by the government to go online, 
supported technically by the government’s agencies. The widespread popularity of sharing economy 
companies including Grab (motor taxi app) and Now (food delivery app) played a highly important 
role in maintaining employment for many businesses in the gig economy.  
It could be said that social mobilisation was a major factor in the country’s virus containment. The 
government prioritised public education of the status of Covid-19 via official government website set 
up by the Ministry of Health which does not only update the location and status of infection cases, 
but also acts as communication portal for children and adults. Beside national television’s daily 
special segment on Covid-19, advices and warnings are sent to each and every mobile users through 
mass messages, every day, directly one from the Ministry of Health, and one from their local leader. 
Official health information, therefore, was clear, timely and uniform.  
Vietnam’s position in global supply chain came into use. Rapid vitro test kits were quickly developed 
by military doctors and MoH. 5000 first kits were produced on March 17th. Hanoi, the city with most 
cases and a hub of transportation, bought 200,000 tests in March alone. On March 20th, Vietnam 
produced enough to start exporting to other countries, including the US. With 2 hours for results, 
this test kit is essential for containing virus infection right at the point of border control so far (for 
most cases were imported) and for the upcoming opening-up period. Knowingly poor in the number 
of ventilators (only 300 per 4 million population in the capital of Hanoi), Vietnam could not afford 
even a slight chance of community infection. Face masks and PPE production were instantly stepped 
up by utilising current textile manufacturing facilities. In April, 50 textile companies produced 8 
million N95 masks per day and a complete set of PPE for healthcare workers at the cheap price of 
£3/set, with quality controlled tightly by iCERT, MoH. Cloth masks, which had been popular in the 
cities due to air pollution, are now being produced at home and by independent companies at a 
faster rate. Exports of these health equipment already started in March but rationed at maximum 
25% of total output by the government for domestic use.  
Notably, the government managed to coordinate its network’s key state-owned companies in 
telecommunication, media, utilities, health, transportation, defence and manufacturing effectively 
so that the country could still run without economic activities by the private sector. The government 
pledged a $30bn for public investment in  
Vietnam resumed rice exports on May 1st and schools were reopened on May 04th. For now, the 
country is basically back to normal with zero death and only 22 patients in treatment20. However, 
the national task force has not been disposed of, border has not yet opened, all businesses must 
follow new Health and Safety regulations. Vietnam is still on alert for the second wave.  
6. Europe 
A. Greece  
Lesson 1: Despite severe cuts in the health care budget, the national healthcare system was key in 
addressing the pandemic 
Lesson 2: The Mitsotakis government used the crisis as a pretext to rush through outsourcing deals 
that hand over the management of Covid-19 to private companies. 
The circumstances of dealing with a pandemic were far from ideal in Greece. Since 2008 the country 
had battled with austerity measures and especially the health care budget was cut, with a 50 per cent 
reduction in funding for public hospitals between 2009 and 2015.xxiv Consequently 54 of the 137 
hospitals were closed and the remaining ones had their budgets cuts by 40 percent.xxv And more than 
13,000 doctors and over 26,000 other healthcare workers lost their jobs between 2009 and 2016. xxvi 
The understaffing in hospitals is severe. Currently there are around 5,000 jobs for hospital doctors 
vacant and there is a shortage of approximately 25,000 nurses.xxvii There were only 560 intensive care 
beds before the Corona crisis while 2,000 would have been needed according to international 
standards.xxviii 
Yet, Greece seemed to have managed with the pandemic far better than other countries. Parts of it 
was due to luck, as the pandemic hit the country much later than other European nations, giving 
Greece time to learn its lessons from Italy. But it was also due to Greece’s quick and effective response. 
In mid-March, just two weeks after the first confirmed infection, restrictive measures were 
 
20 As of July 12th, there are 372 cases, in which 350 were discharged and tested negative, 22 are being treated 
in hospital. Data from (Ministry of Health, 2020) 
introduced, for example larger schools were and events cancelled.xxix Shortly after, a full lockdown 
started on the 22 March. 
Apart from going into lockdown quickly Greece also managed to swiftly increase its health care 
capacity, in particular in regard to PPE and hospital beds. By the 16th of April the country had 400 
additional hospital beds and by the 27th of April Greece had almost doubled its intensive care beds to 
1017. One public hospital in Athens, the Pammakaristos General Hospital of Athens, was turned into 
a specific Covid-19 hospital, separating the Corona virus patients from other ill people.xxx 
Greece success is based in its (remaining) publicly owned and controlled public health care sector. Not 
only was the quick increase in intensive care beds provided by public hospitals.xxxi But also the publicly 
owned Pharmaceutical Research and Technology Company (IFET S.A.) imported and distributed 
essential pharmaceutical products and medical supplies, including PPE, to the National Health 
System.xxxii 
Yet, there is a shadow side to Greece’s response to the pandemic. The Mitsotakis government used 
the crisis as a pretext to rush through outsourcing deals that hand over the management of Covid-19 
to private companies.xxxiii There is a severe lack of transparency about these deals. For example, a 
private company was awarded with a €20m Covid-19 public awareness campaign. The exact details 
on why this company was chosen, what the deal entails, and the exact costings are not revealed to 
the public; despite parliamentary requests, the government has refused to disclose these details. Also, 
the Ministry of Migration and Asylum has been accused of bypassing standard procurement 
procedures and awarding contracts worth millions of euros to private companies while claiming that 
these contracts are “confidential”. Yet, some investigative research suggests that these deals with the 
private providers have been overpriced and lacked planning.xxxiv 
B. Germany 
Lesson 1: a good public health care system with universal access enabled Germany to successfully deal 
with the pandemic 
Lesson 2: Germany’s fatality rate is low as it successfully shielded the older population 
Lesson 3: The trends of a decrease in hospitals and hospital privatisation could be exacerbated through 
the covid-19 pandemic.  
Germany was well positioned to deal with the pandemic, it had a good functioning public health care 
system and expert scientific institutions it could utilise in its response to Covid-19. Health care is 
universal and well-funded, with Germany, the fourth largest economy in the world, spending 11 per 
cent of its gross domestic product on health care. It is leading in Europe in terms of hospital beds per 
people ratio (with 8.3 beds per 1000 people) and also ranks among the top five EU countries in the 
number of nurses (13.2) and physicians (4.2) per 1000 people.xxxv Germany’s intensive care beds were 
not over-stretched and Germany could even fly in and treat Covid-19 patients from France and 
Italy.xxxvi Yet, like other countries Germany experienced a shortage of PPE for health care workers, 
which sparked a national protest of health care workers posing naked in order to raise awareness 
about the vulnerable position health care workers find themselves in. xxxvii 
There is universal access to health care in Germany as health insurance is mandatory for all citizens 
and permanent residents of Germany. Almost 90 per cent of the population are covered through 
statutory health insurance, which is financed through income-related contributions borne by 
employers and employees and supplemented by the state. While unemployed people and benefits 
receivers are also covered by the health insurance system refugees and asylum seekers are not 
covered by the statutory health insurance but they basic medical and emergency treatment.xxxviii 
Around 10 percent of the population are covered through private insurance. 
Due to its aging population Germany was at a higher risk to face high fatality rates due to Covid-19, as 
more older than younger people die from the virus. Yet through a combination of high levels of testing 
(the highest in the EU) and especially among high-risk people and health care and in nursing homes 
workers, contact tracing and shielding of the older population, the number of infections among people 
who are older than 70 was half of that in Italy (19 per cent in Germany, vs 39 per cent in Italy). This is 
believed to be one of the main reasons why the fatality rate in Germany is much lower than in other 
European countries; as of May 2020 the fatality rate was 4.6 per cent compared with 14.1 percent in 
Italy and 12 percent in Spain.xxxix However, the death rates were with 37 per cent as of May 2020, 
highest in care homes and shelter facilities, such homeless shelters, community facilities for asylum-
seekers, repatriates and refugees and prisons. Nonetheless, this is a much lower proportion than in 
other European countries, such as Belgium, France, Norway, Sweden where the death rate in care 
homes, shelter facilities and prisons was higher than 50 per cent.  
Apart from its properly funded health care system and also the fortunate position of having hit by the 
Covid-19 pandemic later than other European countries, such as Italy, many also attribute Germany’s 
successful response to Covid-19 to its political leadership.xlAngela Merkel has been praised for her 
evidence-based and consensus-oriented leadership style.xli Public trust in the government is high;xlii 
and Germany’s hard right party, the Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD), which has significantly gained 
in popularity since it was founded in 2013, has seen a drastic decline during the pandemic.xliii The 
public followed the guidance of the government and so Germany never had a full lockdown, the 
guidance was voluntary and people remained free to leave the house for walks as often as they liked. 
Physical distancing restrictions were, however, in place. One month after its first case on the 27th of 
January, mass gatherings and travel were increasingly restricted and in late March Germany enforced 
strict physical distancing guidelines, banning groups of more than two people and the closure of most 
businesses. The government also did not introduce surveillance mechanisms.xliv 
Currently, more than a third of hospitals are privatised – and roughly one third is run by the 
municipalities and one third run by non-profit providers. Also, the vast majority of nursing homes in 
Germany are privately run.xlv The corona pandemic showed again that it is the state – with taxpayers’ 
money – that steps in in times of need and not the private providers. Again, it means, profits are 
privatised while losses socialised. xlvi Privatisation of hospitals means that management decisions put 
economic efficiency over well-being. Planned surgeries are much more lucrative than emergency care. 
This can mean, for example, that private hospitals are not keen to treat corona patients in order not 
to lose lucrative patients.xlvii To work around this the German government tried to economically 
incentivise the treatment of corona patients by offering hospitals 560 Euros per day for each bed that 
is kept free for Covid-19 and a one-off payment of 50,000 euros for each new intensive care unit.xlviii 
While the corona pandemic demonstrated the importance of public and universal health care there is 
a risk that the pandemic will accelerate the privatisation of hospitals in Germany. Already, before the 
pandemic there were two trends regarding Germany’s hospitals, namely a decrease in hospitals and 
a steady increase in privatisation.xlix In 2000 there were 2242 hospitals, but by 2008 this was reduced 
to 1925 hospitals (see Figure x). Consequently, also the number of hospital beds were reduced 
significantly.l At the same time, while in the year 2000 21,7 per cent of the hospitals were privatised 
this increased to 37.5 per cent in 2018.li Neoliberal think thanks such as the Bertelsmann Foundation 
and other lobby groups have pushed for a while for an increased marketisation of hospitals, in 
especially further privatisation and a decrease in the number of hospitals – the bigger the more 
profitable, is the mantra. Suggesting that there was a “oversupply” in health care, a 2019 report from 
the Bertelsmann foundation argued that the number of hospitals should be cut by more than a half.lii 
A study from 2018 showed that especially municipal and regional hospitals risk privatisation. liii The 
public hospitals are under pressure as government funding has shrunk, in real terms, by a third since 
1991.liv The same study also showed that private hospitals employ less staff than municipal hospitals, 
and are less likely to have staff on full time contracts, moreover private hospitals are more likely to 
outsource cleaning and catering to other private providers. Low wages are the consequence and trade 
unions have pointed out that in some private hospitals the lowest wages are below the minimum 
wage.lv Yet, it is exactly this over-capacity, by not running hospitals in line with a tight profit margin, 
that allowed Germany to deal well with the pandemic.lvi 
 




In terms of economic recovery plans, Germany committed 130 billion euros to pandemic recovery, of 
which 30 per cent will be spend on activities that will cut emissionslvii, such as subsidies for electric 
vehicles, improving building energy efficiency and enhance public transport networks.lviii 
 
C. UK 
xix. Universal public healthcare system 
xx. Austerity 
xxi. Weak local/regional involvement 
xxii. Ideological denial of virus and of collective public health 
xxiii. Business influence on policy 
xxiv. Low priority to protecting workers 
xxv. Disproportionate impact on ethnic minorities 
xxvi. Privatisation/outsourcing of supply chain, and some healthcare 
xxvii. Privatisation/outsourcing of Covid19 public health measures 
 
The UK has experienced the second highest death rate of coronavirus in the world, 68 per 100,000 
population (as at mid-July 2020), despite having one of the best universal public healthcare systems 
in the world, the NHS. The UK government introduced lockdown too late, lost public confidence that 
there was a clear and universally applicable set of rules, struggled to provide adequate protection 
for hospital, care home, and public transport workers, failed (in England) to set up an effective 
system of test, track and trace, had very poor collaboration with regional and local governments and 
community organisations, and relaxed restrictions without sufficient regard to worker or public 
safety.  
People from black and minority ethnic groups (BAME), including key workers in health and social 
care, have been harder hit by Covid-19. The data shows that this disproportionate impact of Covid-
19 on BAME groups is due the relative deprivation of BAME population, with lower incomes, more 
crowded housing, higher stress from low social status, and higher likelihood of working in ‘frontline’ 
work – and that relative deprivation is itself due to racism. As professor Michael Marmot of UCL 
states:  
“Health follows a social gradient…not just in the UK but everywhere. [The link between] 
deprivation and COVID-19 mortality is really similar to the gradient in mortality from all 
causes… Because of systematic disadvantage – racism – black people are more likely than 
the general population to be in deprived circumstances….structural racism is a cause of 
excess COVID-19 mortality in BAME communities.” 
The major factors behind the UK’s poor performance are also clear: austerity, outsourcing, and right-
wing nationalist ideology. A series of governments since the financial crisis of 2008 had applied 
austerity policies, cutting resources especially for local public services; since 2012 the NHS has been 
opened up for outsourcing of all elements; business interests have a strong and increasingly 
institutionalised influence on government policy-making; and right-wing nationalist ideology has 
become increasingly influential.  
Austerity policies created problems by cutting capacity to deal with epidemics. The NHS carried out 
an exercise code-named ‘Cygnus’ in 2016 to plan for a serious epidemic, which identified lack of 
resources in care homes and under-staffing of local councils, but the recommendations were 
ignored and not published. The NHS had created a stockpile of PPE and other equipment in case of 
an epidemic, but the stock was reduced by 40% in the six years before Covid19 as part of austerity 
measures. In 2017 the government rejected a recommendation for an increase in the PPE 
equipment stockpiled because it “would substantially increase the cost”. The fragmentation of the 
NHS in 2012, designed to encourage outsourcing, abolished regional NHS structures and “created 
major barriers to coordination”. Local authorities in England were not involved in the UK 
government’s planning of the response to Covid19.  
The initial UK government response was to reject a general lockdown, on the basis that people 
would not observe it, and to reject the idea of universal testing, and instead to allow the epidemic to 
develop to “build up some degree of herd immunity”. It also formally downgraded the seriousness of 
Covid19, and downplayed the need for significant restrictions - on 3rd March the prime minister said 
he was happy to shake hands with Covid19 patients and that people should ‘basically just go about 
our normal lives’. In response to strong lobbying, major sporting events – such as a huge 4-day 
horse-racing event at Cheltenham on 16 March - were allowed to go ahead. This ‘herd immunity’ 
approach, strongly influenced by libertarian ideology, was then reversed after modelling showed 
that it would potentially lead to 500,000 deaths. By the time the UK introduced a lockdown on 23 
March, “almost two months of potential preparation and prevention time had been squandered”, 
and this delay alone is estimated to have cost an extra 20,000 lives. There has also been substantial 
pressure from UK companies for the government to relax the lockdown restrictions. 
The NHS had already been subjected to a long-term process over 25 years of outsourcing NHS 
services and supplies. Even the procurement process itself was outsourced to private companies 
who then awarded monopoly contracts for supplies of PPE, warehousing, logistics, and IT services.  
The government has continued this process in 2020, by outsourcing every possible part of the new 
resources spent to control the Covid19 epidemic, instead of strengthening the capacity of the NHS. 
This includes PPE, testing, tracking and tracing, and has led to repeated problems: 
• the warehouse stockpiling PPE for just such an emergency was unable to deliver to hospitals, 
with workers describing the system as ‘chaotic’ and insufficient, out of date stock.  
• The government gave an emergency contract to Deloitte to sort out the system, but this was 
described even by suppliers as a “disaster”, with Deloittes trying to source PPE from China 
and ignoring offers from local communities, universities and small businesses in the UK, who 
all reacted rapidly to offer to start producing PPE locally.  
• A new system to supply PPE to care homes and GPs was outsourced to a company whose 
CEO is a leading donor and supporter of the Conservative Party: but the system was too 
slow, and care homes and councils were still “not able to access sufficient supplies of PPE”.  
• Contracts to operate drive-through coronavirus testing centres were awarded without 
competition to Deloitte, which sub-contracted other outsourcing specialists Serco, Mitie, 
G4S and Sodexo to manage the centres. These arrangements have failed, with the centres 
being reported as “too far away”, the wrong tests being sent out, results being lost, and 
others being sent to the wrong person 
• The track and trace work in England has been outsourced to Serco, under yet another 
uncompetitive contract, which Serco hope will “cement the position of the private sector” in 
the NHS. This too has proved a disaster, failing to contact thousands of people in the worst-
affected areas, while ignoring the potential role of local councils. 
• The government issued a contract for a tracking app to a software firm with links to the 
prime minister’s special adviser. The app failed to work, and has been cancelled.  
• private hospitals have been seeking to gain outsourcing contracts from the NHS for many 
years, and gained hugely from Covid19 when the UK government required all private 
hospitals to make themselves 100% available for NHS work, under contracts worth 
£400million per month whereby the government pays all the running expenses of the 
private hospitals to be available for NHS work. The companies persuaded the UK 
government to extend this deal with a £5 billion contract for the next year, but the Treasury 
reportedly refused to endorse this.  
• Even the work of organising meal vouchers for 1.5million children from poor families was 
outsourced to a contractor, Edenred, whose system then proved unable to cope with the 
demand.  
The flattening of the curve and relaxation of restrictions has been followed by further outbreaks of 
cases caused by employers using unsafe working practices, especially where migrant workers are 
employed: “In the US, Europe and Asia, poor working conditions in care homes, meat plants and 
factories have helped to spread the virus.” A second wave of Covid 19 forced the second lockdown 
lockdown in the city of Leicester where cramped clothing sweatshops were employing workers with 
Covid symptoms, paying far below the minimum wage, to supply highly profitable online clothing 
retailers such as Boohoo. Outbreaks also emerged  in meat factories in Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
where people had to work and eat too close to each other: migrants from all continents make up the 







xxviii. Public healthcare system 
xxix. Herd immunity and death rates 
xxx. No/weak lockdown 
xxxi. Nationalist/racist rhetoric 
 
Sweden has traditionally been regarded as a model social democratic country with strong 
technocratic public services, and currently has a government led by the social democrats. However 
in response to Covid19, unlike nearly all other European countries, Sweden has not applied a general 
lockdown. Bars and restaurants remained open, restrictions on activity are voluntary, schools have 
remained open, little effort was taken to protect care homes, and there has been no 
recommendation for the use of masks. The importance of testing has been downplayed, with one of 
the lowest testing rates in Europe, and contact tracing was abandoned in March, and in June “the 
resources and training are still lacking”.  
The Swedish government says the policy objective has been to slow the epidemic and so protect the 
healthcare system, but a group of leading Swedish doctors and scientists argue that it is in effect a 
policy of ‘herd immunity’, allowing large numbers of people – mainly younger and fitter - to develop 
immunity so that the virus cannot spread.  
This has been supported by a strong nationalist rhetoric, so that Anders Tegnell, the chief 
epidemiologist heading the policy, has been described as “the incarnation of Sweden’s soul”, 
criticism is rejected with “a sense of wounded national pride” , and a very senior epidemiologist has 
suggested that the high death rate in care homes is partly due to staff who are refugees or asylum 
seekers and do not fully understand Swedish. 
But the policy is not working. In mid-July, even in the capital Stockholm only 10% of people were 
immune. According to comments in the FT, many people with Covid symptoms have been refused 
admission to hospital. One man of Turkish origin was flown to Turkey where he was treated and 
recovered.  
And the cumulative death rate per million population is one of the worst in the world, worse than 
the USA.  
“Sweden can be used as a model, but not in the way it was thought of initially. It can instead 
serve as a control group and answer the question of how efficient the voluntary distancing 
and loose measures in Sweden are compared with lockdowns, aggressive testing, tracing and 
the use of masks. In Sweden, the strategy has led to death, grief and suffering. On top of 
that, there are no indications that the Swedish economy has fared better than in many other 
countries. At the moment, we have set an example for the rest of the world on how not to 
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